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For the second time since the signing of the so-called Memorandum of Understanding, the United States and Iran are sliding toward open military confrontation. It is true that the truce established on June 17 was always fragile and precarious, threatened by low-intensity military skirmishes. This is particularly true in Lebanon, where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is keeping the war front open against Hezbollah and refusing to accept being the big loser in a war from which Iran has emerged strategically strengthened.
But unlike the exchanges of fire in recent months, which fell below the threshold of war, the military incidents that began on July 7 are so far the most serious challenge to the continuation of the negotiations.
The sequence began with Iran’s attack on three commercial vessels. In response, the United States bombed some 85 targets, including Revolutionary Guard installations, and suspended the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil exports, to which the Iranian regime responded with a barrage of drones and missiles against U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar.
The immediate trigger for this new escalation is control of the Strait of Hormuz, which has become the center of gravity of both the war and any eventual peace agreement. Iran intends to capitalize on its victory and transform it into a substantial source of revenue for the state coffers through toll collection. Iran’s veto power over traffic in one of the main routes of international trade is the living, undeniable, and enduring symbol of the strategic defeat suffered by the United States. This means that American imperialism cannot simply withdraw from the conflict and pretend nothing happened. It is a war with an impact on global geopolitics (and probably on the class struggle) in the short, medium, and long term.
The 14 points of the memorandum may be very general and open to interpretation (for example, what concrete meaning does Iran’s “best efforts” to open the Strait of Hormuz have?), but the problem isn’t semantic; it is one of balance of power. And in this arena, Iran holds the upper hand. The more than two months of the U.S. naval blockade — with military intervention ruled out — weren’t enough to force Iran to open this vital maritime route for international trade. And on balance, it did more damage to the international economy — particularly to the United States’ Asian allies — than to the Iranian regime.
Having failed to achieve either his objectives through war or the embargo, Trump is using the 60-day window of the memorandum to find ways to weaken the position of Iran and its regional allies, thereby diminishing the Iranian regime’s claim to control traffic in the Strait of Hormuz — a problem that did not exist before the war. It is clear that the nuclear agreement has been relegated to later stages of negotiations, if these negotiations progress at all.
The initial American maneuver, which triggered the latest exchange of attacks, intended to establish an alternative corridor in the strait near Oman’s coasts and encourage traffic through the “Omani route.” This provocation to open the strait without Iran’s permission led Iran to fire on three commercial vessels that, with American approval, were attempting to cross the waterway.
The start of this renewed military escalation coincided with Trump’s participation in the tense NATO summit in Ankara, where, incidentally, he gave a new twist to the war in Ukraine, once again giving some support to Zelenskyy after failing to initiate a dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
True to form, Trump, who had just threatened his European allies with annexing Greenland and was relentlessly bullying his former friend Giorgia Meloni, declared that he thought the agreement with Iran was finished and that negotiating with Iranian leaders (who had gone from being “rational” to “scum” and “garbage”) was a waste of time. At the same time, he maintained that he didn’t believe war was imminent and that he had authorized the American negotiators to continue the dialogue.
The million-dollar question is whether this round of attacks and retaliations will lead to a return to open warfare, or if it’s just another act by Trump, who in his second term seems to have entered a cycle of threats and retreats, earning him the nickname TACO (“Trump Always Chickens Out”). There’s no definitive answer, and while there are compelling arguments that would make a return to war less likely, all possibilities remain open.
If Trump ends up being a complete failure, it won’t be so much because of his buffoonish and unstable personality, which undoubtedly plays a role and speaks to the decline of the American ruling class, but because of the evident limits to the power of U.S. imperialism.
Trump signed the Memorandum of Understanding because he had no better option for extricating himself from the strategic trap he had entered by launching a “war of choice” against Iran, possibly influenced by Netanyahu, with the simplistic notion of achieving a rapid “regime change.” After the first 40 days of air warfare and the establishment of the ceasefire on April 8, it became clear that military escalation was not on the president’s agenda. War is highly unpopular in the United States, even among sectors of the Republican base, and directly impacts people’s finances in the form of inflation, which will very likely end up punishing Trump by causing his party to lose the midterm elections next November.
The instability of the truce and the uncertainty surrounding the future of the negotiations are logical consequences of the balance of power between the U.S. and Iran. Trump is trying to mask the strategic defeat he has suffered in a war not inherited from previous administrations — like those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or even Ukraine, which is a proxy war for the United States and NATO — but of his own making. To this end, he is attempting to use military might without falling into the trap of “endless wars” that American imperialism knows are unwinnable but in which it invests ever-increasing military, financial, and human resources to improve its position and avoid resounding defeats. This was the case with George W. Bush’s “surge” in Iraq, Obama’s counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and, before that, Nixon’s “madman” theory in Vietnam, which consisted of conveying the message that he was prepared to do anything to try to deter the enemy. Of course, it never occurred to Nixon to publicly issue threats and then back down, as Trump is doing.
Meanwhile, the Iranian regime is determined to survive. Following the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the top political and military leadership at the start of the war, the center of gravity of state power shifted to the Revolutionary Guard, and in particular, to the generals who led the war effort. The Islamic Republic is undergoing a transition toward a more militaristic and nationalist regime than a theocratic one. Interestingly, that nationalist character is part of the lingering legacy of the 1979 revolution, which was profoundly anti-imperialist and democratic.
However, this strengthening may be temporary. The Iranian economy has been battered by decades of sanctions and international isolation. The war has destroyed much of its civilian, industrial, and commercial infrastructure, undoubtedly leading to increased unemployment, poverty, and a higher cost of living.
This deterioration in living conditions has fueled the largest protest movement in recent years, initiated not by the urban middle classes opposed to the regime because of its oppressive and reactionary nature, but by the bazaars, the traditional base of support for the ayatollahs. The regime countered this challenge by unleashing brutal repression (which has continued during and after the war), thus cementing its internal unity.
Khamenei’s funeral, attended by millions, was undoubtedly a show of force, both domestically and internationally. It was a traveling political spectacle that lasted six days, covered more than 2,500 km, and extended into Iraq. The timing speaks volumes about the Iranian regime’s regional ambitions. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is preparing to travel to Washington at Trump’s invitation, with an agenda that includes bilateral cooperation and the dismantling of Shiite Islamist militias.
This does not mean that this new regime in formation is untouchable. Even at the funeral, divisions were laid bare between the faction that signed the agreement and favors a diplomatic solution, represented by President Masoud Pezeshkian, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi; and the hardliners within the regime who reject the Memorandum of Understanding with the United States and are pushing to continue the war against the “Great Satan” (and also the “Little Satan,” meaning Israel). This division at the top also permeates the regime’s base, with a sector attending the funeral waving the red flag of vengeance and chanting “Death to the traitors” and other unfriendly slogans directed at the president and his inner circle.
Mojtaba Khamenei, who inherited his father’s position more by virtue of his family name than his own qualifications, is balancing these two factions: he publicly rejected the memorandum of understanding and, in the same act, authorized the president and the other negotiators to conduct the talks. He is thus protecting himself against the potential failure of the peace process.
In a recent interview, Robert Pape, an academic belonging to the realist school of thought, argues that, due to the regime’s resilience in the face of the U.S. and Israeli attack and the leverage it has gained through control of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is emerging from the war as a “fourth center of world power” alongside the United States, Russia, and China. However, even a superficial comparison with U.S. imperialism or emerging powers like China (and even Russia), which dominate the global economy and possess nuclear weapons and enormous military might, is enough to show that Iran remains a dependent country, even if it controls traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
We socialists have supported, and continue to support, the military defeat of the United States and Israel in its wars on Iran and Iraq, and we maintain that this defeat of imperialism — including the defeat of the Zionist state that has been perpetrating genocide in Gaza — while temporarily strengthening a reactionary regime like Iran’s, strategically benefits the struggle of the exploited and oppressed. But that does not mean giving political support to the Iranian regime, which not only represses its people but is also not a consistently anti-imperialist force. Iran does not consistently oppose imperialism; rather, it aspires to improve its position and integrate itself on more favorable terms within the existing imperialist system.
At the same time Trump’s belligerence is not a product of strength but of the crisis of American imperialism, within the context of the growing dispute with China and the trends toward militarism and warmongering, expressed by the rearmament of European powers. The strategic defeat suffered in Iran not only deepens the hegemonic decline of the United States but, in the long run, also weakens its allies and vassals, such as the Milei government in Argentina and the pro-imperialist far-right governments of Latin America.
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